I just finished this book in February of 2001. I find this book to be among the
more balanced depictions of the Microsoft trial that I’ve read; and I feel that
the author has a good general understanding of the issues (though he is still a
bit confused on some technical issues).
Some of the quotes from this book may actually have a bearing on the case as
Judge Jackson is quoted as saying some very unfavorable remarks that could be
used to argue that he showed undue bias against Microsoft. I’m particularly
struck by Jackson’s statements about Microsoft’s lack of contriteness. He seems
to think that Microsoft is not allowed to have the opinion that we did nothing
wrong. I believe that is our prerogative and duty to continue to say so as long
as we still see it that way. But that does not mean that Microsoft could not
honor a well-written and specific behavioral remedy negotiated by the parties.
Jackson seems to equate our disagreement about guilt, with our inability to
conform to a behavioral remedy. I see these as totally separable.
Chapter 21 is particularly interesting as it outlines in some detail, the
negotiated settlement that Microsoft was prepared to accept were it not for the
recalcitrance of the States Attorneys General. This book really points out the
failure of Joel Klein to bring the States together and in line with the US
goverment’s interests in this case.
I find it ironic that the strongest opponents of Microsoft in this case
(AOL/Netscape, Cisco, IBM), are also those that tend to have products that
attempt to “lock in” their customers to a much larger degree than Microsoft has
ever done.
I think what this case failed to really address is the issue of how Microsoft’s
competitors can have the same opportunity to innovate in building desktop
platforms that Microsoft has. It would certainly be a disaster for the US
economy and consumers to have the government appointing a committee as to which
features can be added to Windows. Looking back in hindsight - it seems
unfathomable that Microsoft could NOT integrate a web browser into it’s
operating system as the Internet has become an equal and sometimes more
important component for users than the traditional file system, or windows
interfaces.
At root of Microsofts problems is that given the very vague wording of the US
anti-trust laws, including an imprecise interpretation of monopoly, it’s very
difficult for a company to know when it must stop conforming to the standard
commercial rules that apply to all businesses, and instead start confroming to
the special laws for behavior that apply to a monopoly.
I don’t see how we can escape the labeling of Windows as a monopoly OS on Intel
desktop systems. But what need be done about that? Some of the proposed
behavioral remedies would enable competitors to have equal access to Windows at
a standardized price. OEM’s would be free to install other software as well as
add some non-destructive modifications to the desktop and startup screens. It
would also ensure that developers for Windows could have early and complete
information about the Window’s API’s.
Unfortunately, Microsoft’s enemies are primarily interested in the destruction
of a keen competitor, regardless of the impact or cost to consumers or
Microsoft’s ability to continue to innovate. And the States Attorneys General
seem to be more interested in building publicity for their personal political
careers (and financial backing from the competitive businesses owners in their
states) than they are in acting in the best interests of the citizens of their
states.